US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement by Michele Boyd On September 1, 2000, former US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov signed the US-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition.1 The agreement requires that 68 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium, 34 metric tons for each Party, be put into non-weapons usable form by either irradiating it as fuel in reactors (MOX fuel) or by immobilizing it in glass with high-level radioactive waste. The US has decided to use 25.57 metric tons of plutonium in MOX fuel and to immobilize the rest (8.43 metric tons), while Russia will use all 34 metric tons of its plutonium to make MOX fuel. Some characteristics of the surplus weapons plutonium stocks are summarized in the tables below. Quantities and Methods of Disposition For the United States of America Quantity (metric tons) Form Method of Disposition 25.00 Pits and Clean Metal Irradiation as MOX 0.57 Oxide Irradiation as MOX 2.70 Impure Metal Immobilization 5.73 Oxide Immobilization For the Russian Federation Quantity (metric tons) Form Method of Disposition 25.00 Pits and Clean Metal Irradiation as MOX 9.00 Oxide Irradiation as MOX Forms: Pits and Clean Metals: plutonium in or from weapon components or weapon parts, and plutonium metal prepared for fabrication into weapon parts. Plutonium in pits may be alloyed, notably with gallium. Impure Metals: plutonium alloyed with one or more other elements in the form of a homogenous metal, and unalloyed plutonium metal that is not clean metal. Oxide: plutonium in the form of plutonium dioxide. Source: Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, Annex on Quantities, Forms, Locations, and Methods of Disposition, Sections I and II (September 1, 2000). According to the agreement (some excerpts are provided below), the immobilized plutonium can never be separated, but a country may reprocess its spent MOX fuel after all 34 metric tons of its plutonium are dispositioned. Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) has clearly stated that it intends to reprocess the MOX fuel as part of the first step in developing a "closed" nuclear fuel cycle (see main article, Plutonium End Game). Given the timeline of the MOX program in the agreement, Russia will be allowed to re-extract residual plutonium from the spent MOX fuel by 2025, perhaps earlier. While the majority of the declared surplus plutonium is slated for use in light water reactors in the US and Russia, Russia also intends to use some of its MOX fuel in fast breeder reactors.2 MOX fuel for fast reactors contains a much higher percentage of plutonium than that for light water reactors. Two crucial issues in the agreement, financing of and liability for the Russian program, have been left to future negotiations, and until they are resolved, the MOX program in Russia cannot proceed. Furthermore, the deal stipulates that within one year, an agreement shall be reached on doubling the disposition rate, though how this is to be done is not entirely clear at the present time. These three issues are discussed in more detail below. Financing The financing plan for the Russian MOX program has been left to future negotiations, with a goal of concluding a multilateral agreement by September 1, 2001. If an agreement is not completed by March of the following year, the US and Russia can either agree to adjust the schedules of their programs or terminate the program altogether. The current estimate for the cost of the Russian MOX program is between $1.7 and 2.5 billion, while the US program is estimated to be approximately $4 billion.3 The United States has allocated $200 million for implementing the Russian program, and promised another $200 million, which has not yet been appropriated by Congress. The United States and Russia discussed multilateral financing of the Russian MOX program with the other leaders from the G-8 countries (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan) at a meeting in Okinawa, Japan, last July. Britain has committed $100 million and France is contributing approximately $60 million. These contributions, together with those of the US, total roughly $560 million, out of the $900 million deemed necessary to begin design and construction of Russian MOX facilities.4 The G-8 agreed to work out an international financing plan for the Russian program before they meet again in Genoa, Italy, next July. A special task force within the G-8 Nonproliferation Experts Group has been established to develop a financing package and multilateral project structure, including issues such as how the project management would be structured and the oversight rights of donor countries. The European Bank for Reconstruction & Development has been approached about whether they would manage the implementation of the Russian MOX program.5 Liability The United States and Russia have not yet agreed on who would be held financially accountable for any claims relating to the Russian MOX program. In the United States, the Price-Anderson Act provides up to $10 billion dollars to nuclear power plant owners in case of an accident.6 Such a level of financial compensation on the Russian side, though insufficient for addressing a large nuclear accident, would be unlikely given Russia's economy. Moreover, there may be less regulatory oversight of the MOX program in Russia - a bill was recently introduced in the Duma that would, if passed, transfer the authority to license civilian-related nuclear activities from the federal regulatory agency, Gosatomnadzor (GAN), to Minatom. Although Minatom would prefer to use MOX in a "new generation" of fast reactors, which would take many years to build, it has agreed to the US plan to use MOX in existing light water reactors (LWRs). Given that the US is funding this plan, at least in part, an accident in a Russian LWR using MOX fuel could cause a serious political crisis over liability between the two countries, even if an agreement is reached. The deal stipulates that the US and Russia shall conclude an agreement on liability no later than the entry into force of a multilateral financing agreement, which is to be completed by September 1, 2001. Meanwhile, assistance to Russia is limited to pre-construction design work, which Russia is not permitted to use to build or operate a MOX plant until the question of liability is resolved. Rate of disposition The plutonium agreement sets December 31, 2007, as the target date to begin operating the plutonium disposition facilities with a minimum disposition goal of two metric tons per year in each country. Russia promoted a "western option," in which Russian-made MOX would be used in western European reactors. However, the French reprocessing company, Cogéma, which fabricates MOX fuel for western reactors, has been opposed to the plan because the Russian-made MOX could be sold at subsidized prices. Russia has since agreed to use the MOX fuel in its own reactors before selling any MOX fuel to other countries.7 As the US-Russian agreement on the disposition of highly enriched uranium8 illustrates, the commercial component of disposition programs can slow the disposition rate. According to a recent report by the General Accounting Office, the deliveries of Russian-made low enriched uranium (LEU) to the US have been delayed because Russia was dissatisfied with the level of revenue that it was receiving under the agreement. Moreover, USEC, Inc., the private US company that implements the commercial contract, considered resigning as the executive agent in 1999 because the decline in market prices for LEU had reduced their profits.9 The agreement also stipulates that the US and Russia develop a detailed action plan by September 1, 2001, to at least double this disposition rate. Several options for increasing this rate are listed, including: Exporting MOX fuel for use in other countries: Minatom is particularly interested in this option. Sweden and Canada have expressed interest in using Russian MOX fuel in their reactors. Both Russia and the US have sent MOX samples to Canada for testing in a CANDU reactor, but the US has decided not to export its MOX fuel as part of its disposition program. Increasing the number of reactors that use MOX within Russia: This option appears unlikely at this time, because the number of Russian reactors that can use MOX fuel is limited and Russia does not have the funds to complete the several reactors that have been under construction for years. US assistance under the agreement does not include funding for completing these reactors or for building new ones. However, the agreement does allow for US assistance for modifying existing Russian reactors to use MOX. Using greater than 1/3 core MOX: New reactors can be designed to take 100% MOX cores, but all of Russia's existing reactors would require modifications for any MOX use. Even a partial MOX core in a LWR makes operation and control of the reactor more complicated. Using "advanced nuclear reactors": Minatom has stated that it wants to build a "new generation" of breeder reactors. General Atomics and Framatome, with the US Department of Energy, Minatom and Fuji Electric, are researching a Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor, potentially for MOX fuel use after 2010.10 Increasing the capacity of the conversion and MOX fuel fabrication facilities. Quotes from the US-Russian Agreement on Plutonium Disposition "Neither Party shall separate plutonium contained in spent fuel until such time as that Party has fulfilled the obligation set forth in paragraph 1 of Article II of this Agreement [disposed of no less than thirty-four (34) metric tons of disposition plutonium]." -- Article VI, paragraph 2 "No Party shall separate disposition plutonium contained in immobilized forms." -- Article VI, paragraph 3 "Assistance provided by the Government of the United States of America [to the Russian Federation] shall be for such activities as the research, design, development, licensing, construction and/or modification of facilities (including modification of nuclear reactors), and technological processes, systems and associated infrastructure for such activities." -- Article IX, paragraph 1 "[T]he Parties shall cooperate with a view toward concluding within one (1) year after entry into force of this Agreement a multilateral agreement that documents the assistance arrangements necessary for [a disposition rate of two metric tons per year.]" -- Article IX, paragraph 8 "In the event the Government of the Russian Federation suspends any implementation activities..., the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to suspend proportionately its implementation activities under this Agreement." -- Article IX, paragraph 14 "No spent plutonium fuel shall be reprocessed by either Party after termination of this Agreement unless such reprocessing is subject to monitoring agreed by the Parties...." -- Article XIII, paragraph 7 "The Parties shall continue negotiations on liability provisions to apply to all claims that may arise from activities undertaken pursuant to the Agreement and shall seek to conclude an agreement ... at the earliest practicable date, and, in any event, not later than entry into force of the multilateral agreement...." -- Annex on Assistance, Section II, paragraph 1 "Until entry into force of the agreement containing liability provisions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Section: a) assistance activities under the Agreement shall be limited to appropriate pre-construction design work; b) neither Party shall be obligated under the Agreement to construct, modify, or operate disposition facilities, including reactors; and c) the Russian Federation shall not utilize in any way the pre-construction design work conducted under the Agreement including for the construction, modification, or operation of disposition facilities (including reactors)." -- Annex on Assistance, Section II, paragraph 2 Source: Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, September 1, 2000.