The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:
Where do we go from here?

Editorial by Hisham Zerriffi and Michele Boyd

The founders of the United States "relied upon Grotius, Montesquieu and other 'foreigners' in drafting its Constitution. Two hundred years later, it needs help again to teach it about the advantages of cooperation with other countries in dealing with international security. Americans must somehow cage the beast of unbridled sovereignty espoused by radical conservatives and accept once again the idea in their Constitution that treaties with other countries are the supreme law of the land." (George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, "Senate CTBT Rejection Not the End," Disarmament Diplomacy No. 41, November 1999)

The failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) last October has fundamentally changed international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. The CTBT was established as the linchpin of efforts to reduce nuclear dangers. It is not only a non-proliferation treaty, raising political and technical hurdles for any country designing nuclear weapons for the first time, but also a cornerstone of efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. This is stated very clearly and repeatedly in the preamble to the treaty, including the recognition that: ... the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The CTBT was also seen as a concrete step necessary for the nuclear weapons states to meet their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (an obligation reinforced by an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice). The NPT bound the non-nuclear weapons states to forego developing their own weapons in return for a commitment by the nuclear powers to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. That basic agreement was reiterated when the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995 and the speedy negotiation of the CTBT was established as a step towards meeting those commitments. By rejecting the treaty, the United States Senate has called into question the core of the non-proliferation regime. One of the core arguments of CTBT opponents in the United States was that testing would, in the long run, be required for an "enduring" US nuclear arsenal, seen as essential for maintaining US "nuclear deterrence." CTBT opponents find the treaty unacceptable because it would promote disarmament. Official CTBT proponents in the Clinton administration were content to argue that it would lock in the overwhelming US nuclear advantage, since, unlike the United States, the vast majority of countries have not tested nuclear weapons. Yet the United States is obligated by Article VI of the NPT to pursue complete nuclear disarmament in good faith. By defeating the CTBT on the premise of maintaining a permanent US nuclear arsenal, the US simultaneously violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the NPT. The Senate's failure to ratify the CTBT did more than put the NPT in jeopardy. The Senate vote came at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and other nuclear weapons states, particularly Russia and China, over issues such as the bombing of Yugoslavia and U.S. efforts to change the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. These actions threaten to halt all efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and may in fact trigger a new arms race. Given this situation, what are the prospects for a comprehensive nuclear test ban? The option receiving the most attention is for the US Senate to take up the CTBT again, once a new Administration enters in 2001. However, there is no guarantee that the incoming Administration will view the treaty favorably. Even with a supportive new Administration, the position of the Senate may not change dramatically enough to alter the outcome of the vote. A second rejection of the treaty would have immeasurable consequences. Even worse, given the controversy around the CTBT in the Senate, the treaty may not be passed without extensive conditions being placed on it. These conditions may not be acceptable to other parties to the CTBT without international renegotiation of the treaty. This is both unlikely and undesirable. Without a treaty, the international norm against nuclear testing will remain an ad hoc prohibition and may erode over time. However, since treaty ratification cannot be assured for the foreseeable future and it will be necessary to ensure that adherence to the CTBT is universal after ratification, a second option must be pursued that preserves the core elements of the nuclear test ban without relying on the vagaries of politics. The basic elements of the CTBT can be preserved through various means of enforcement that do not require formal ratification of the treaty. Both the intent of the CTBT and the implementation of its basic policies remain an important part of the solution for reducing nuclear dangers. Thus, the goals of the CTBT, an end to nuclear explosions and an end to nuclear weapons development, need to be realized even without US ratification of the treaty. These can be accomplished by both popular pressure from civil society and by the actions of states determined to move the disarmament agenda forward. End Nuclear Explosions A testing moratorium is one of the most important declarations that a country can make to show it is serious about non-proliferation and disarmament. The US is the only country whose legislature has rejected ratification once it has been brought to a vote (see box on CTBT ratification status), which has seriously damaged US credibility and leadership on international non-proliferation efforts. The US will only maintain what little leverage it has left as long as it does not test. In 1992, the US Congress mandated a temporary unilateral nuclear testing moratorium, which was a major factor in restarting the nuclear test ban negotiations. President Bill Clinton has twice extended this moratorium and again pledged to continue the moratorium after the Senate rejected the CTBT. There are two other major drivers to maintain a worldwide testing moratorium until a CTBT formally enters into force: popular enforcement and foreign government pressure. In order for popular enforcement (i.e. public pressure) to be effective, the political and economic consequences of nuclear testing have to be clear to any governments considering resuming testing (or testing for the first time). The public outcry over the French test series in 1995-1996 and the accompanying boycotts of French products could be a model for future actions against states that conduct nuclear explosions. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan also resulted in public and governmental opposition.1 However, more important than actions taken after a country has tested, popular enforcement must be geared towards preventing nuclear explosions. Such action could take the form of public demonstrations of support for the moratorium, political organizing to persuade leaders, and/or the clear threat of political and economic penalties for testing from within and outside individual countries. The New Agenda Coalition's successful efforts to pass disarmament votes in the United Nations (in which key NATO allies abstained rather than voting with the nuclear powers) demonstrates that political support exists for stronger action on nuclear disarmament, including a halt to nuclear testing.2 Governmental pressure for a continued moratorium should be exerted through the United Nations, the NPT Review Conference and other fora. An enduring testing moratorium should also include support for the verification regime, strict adherence to the spirit and letter of the CTBT (see below), and closure of existing nuclear weapons test sites as well as their clean-up. Strengthening the ties between governments and civil society in those countries where government support for a test ban is strong would significantly enhance both popular enforcement and governmental pressure. The strength of such coordinated action has already proven to be effective and was key in establishing the current test moratorium. In another field, the successful campaign for an international treaty to ban land mines is a good example of this type of governmental/non-governmental cooperation. Coordinated action by governmental and non-governmental actors advocating disarmament would be difficult for any country to ignore. The ultimate goal must be to bring all governments within the legal framework and to hold all governments equally accountable before the law. Pressure on the United States and other countries reluctant to endorse the treaty would also be greatly enhanced by the ratification of the treaty by Russia and by the signing of the treaty by India and Pakistan. End Nuclear Weapons Development In order to fulfill its dual purpose, a comprehensive test ban must constrain nuclear weapons development by all states, including the nuclear weapons states. For those states currently without nuclear weapons, a monitored testing moratorium would make development of a weapon far more difficult than it is today. However, placing effective constraints on the improvement of existing arsenals by the nuclear weapons states is more complex due to their extensive experience with nuclear weapons design and testing. The nuclear weapons states, most notably the United States and France, have instead tied their adherence to a CTBT with the entrenchment of their nuclear weapons design programs. The primary reason behind these multi-billion dollar programs is ostensibly to maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons arsenals indefinitely as they age. Another objective is to "provide and demonstrate the capability to design and develop replacement nuclear weapons and associated components."3 This is being done through vastly expanded nuclear weapons experimentation and computer modeling capabilities. However, it has been shown that these stockpile stewardship programs have little to do with safely maintaining arsenals in the context of a path towards disarmament (see IEER's report Nuclear Safety Smokescreen). Rather, they are explicitly designed to maintain and even expand the ability of the nuclear weapons states to design new nuclear warheads and redesign existing warheads.4 While most components of the stockpile stewardship programs do not technically violate the CTBT, their emphasis on nuclear weapons design certainly violates the spirit of the treaty. However, the large laser fusion facilities at the center of both the US and French programs violate the letter of the treaty. The U.S. National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the French Laser Mégajoule (LMJ) are designed to create small thermonuclear explosions in the laboratory. According to IEER's analysis, they would violate Article I of the CTBT, which bans all nuclear explosions, and would effectively erase any upper limit on thermonuclear explosions if allowed to operate.5 Britain is contributing to the US effort and is therefore in violation of Article I, which also prohibits encouragement and support of nuclear explosions. Popular enforcement and governmental pressure to maintain a nuclear testing moratorium must also be extended to ending the stockpile stewardship programs of the nuclear weapons states, at least in so far as they violate the CTBT and are oriented to new weapons design. Specifically, ratification of the CTBT should not be connected to the funding of any program designed to maintain, expand, and exercise capabilities to design nuclear weapons, because such a program is inconsistent with the treaty. While a small number of NGOs have focused on ending these programs in order to achieve a more durable test ban, these efforts need a broader coalition of NGOs and governments to succeed. Sympathetic governments must use international fora to press the nuclear weapons states to comply with their obligations under the CTBT, including challenging the NIF and LMJ projects, which should be cancelled. For their part, national legislators in the nuclear weapons states can stand up to entrenched political and economic interests through their legislative, budgetary and oversight capacities.6 Stockpile stewardship programs could be re-designed into engineering-based programs leading to disarmament. Such programs would focus on monitoring warheads and maintaining warhead safety without an emphasis on design and production. National policies within the nuclear weapons states that prohibit the research, design, development or production of new nuclear warhead types7 would be a significant step towards demonstrating compliance with the CTBT. Conclusion Despite the current situation with regards to the CTBT, the fundamental purpose of the treaty can still be achieved through concerted action. Such actions should have three main goals. First, international norms against nuclear explosions and nuclear weapons design programs should be further strengthened in order to achieve the goals of the CTBT even without a treaty in force. Second, countries outside, or on the margin, of the current legal framework (especially the United States, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) should be brought into that framework. Third, equality before the law for both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states must be ensured. All three of these goals can only be achieved by a combination of popular, governmental, and legislative pressure, preferably in coordination with one another. Only then will the nuclear weapons beast be caged. For the CTBT to take effect, ratification is required from the 44 nuclear-capable countries. As of October 1999, 41 of these countries have signed the treaty (*), 26 have signed and ratified (bold), and one has voted down the treaty (italics). Algeria*, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh*, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile*, China*, Colombia*, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Egypt*, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia*, Iran*, Italy, Israel*, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Romania, Russian Federation*, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey*, Ukraine*, United Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam*. Source: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, http://www.clw.org/coalition/bkgrsign.htm. Also available on this website: Verification and Enforcement Verification Case Study: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty