Nuclear dangers have been rising rather than declining, due in no small part to the direction that some nuclear-related treaties are taking. The following provides an update to the compilation of nuclear-related treaties published in the October 1998 double issue of Science for Democratic Action.

NATO summit

Status: The NATO Summit was held in Washington, DC, April 22-24, 1999 during the NATO-Yugoslavia war. NATO members and all "partners," except one, participated. NATO "partner" Russia boycotted the meeting. NATO members and partner countries are listed in the accompanying map. A new Strategic Concept was issued at the summit. Quotations below are from this document.

Main nuclear implications: (i) NATO decided that it may undertake operations that go beyond the defense of borders of its member states. (ii) NATO toned down the language indicating that it is less likely to use nuclear weapons by stating (para 64):

"...NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote....NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate [nuclear] sub-strategic forces based in Europe."

(iii) NATO dids not rule out basing nuclear weapons in new member states that are closer to Russian borders. (iv) The US will maintain nuclear weapons in Europe (Para 42) "The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America." (v) NATO retained the option to use nuclear weapons first in any conflict (para 46):

"To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level....[T]he Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace."

Comments: NATO's decision on out-of-area operations has heightened US-Russian tensions, notably in the context of the NATO decision to bomb Yugoslavia without first presenting the case for humanitarian intervention to the Security Council. Three NATO partners (Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, and Kyrghyz Republic) share borders with China. Various events, including NATO action in Yugoslavia, have heightened US-Chinese tensions. The retention of first use option and the high value given to nuclear weapons by NATO has increased concerns that other countries would see this as a message that nuclear deterrence is a desirable security policy, thereby undermining non-proliferation.

References: The US government's NATO summit web site is: http://nato50.gov. The quotes above are from NATO's new Strategic Concept, which can be found at http://nato50.gov/text/99042411.htm.

Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty

Status: The NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting was held in New York in May 1999 with the objective of preparing for the review of the NPT to be held next year by its 186 signatories. (All countries except Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan have signed and ratified the NPT.) The 107 or so countries that participated in the PrepCom agreed on some procedures for the Review Conference, which will take place in New York from April 24 to May 19, 2000.

Main nuclear implications: The participating countries failed to achieve consensus on an agenda for the Review Conference. Specifically, there was no agreement on whether and how to discuss the nuclear disarmament obligations of the five nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT and on the issue of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the NPT PrepCom, the discussions on nuclear disarmament at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament continue to be stalemated. Further, there has been no progress towards a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes. China and Russia want the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on the "prevention of an arms race in outer space," which the United States opposes. The Yugoslavia war demonstrated, among other things, the use of satellite-assisted targeting of non-nuclear weapons. Precision-guided non-nuclear weapons, which are part of the Pentagon's "Revolution in Military Affairs" (for more information, see SDA double issue on disarmament (vol. 6 no. 4 and vol. 7 no. 1), October 1998).

Comments: The failure so far of the preparations for the review of the NPT to lay the framework for agreement on its nuclear disarmament provision (Article VI) bodes ill for the non-proliferation regime. NATO's insistence on retaining nuclear weapons in Europe as part of its "deterrence" strategy, despite the overwhelming and demonstrated dominance in the non-nuclear arena, raises more insistently an old question. If nuclear weapons make a "unique" contribution to NATO deterrence strategy, why should other countries continue to forgo them? This question becomes especially relevant when considered in light of the failure of the United States, Russia, Britain, and France, as well as NATO, to provide firm assurances that they will never threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT. These "negative security assurances" had been promised to the non-nuclear states in 1995 as part of the process of the indefinite extension of the NPT in that year. The crisis in non-proliferation is being intensified by the fact that, of the nuclear weapons states, only China has explicitly recognized the World Court's advisory opinion that the NPT requires the nuclear weapons states to actually achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

According to Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym Institute, the "inability [of the NPT PrepCom] to adopt any meaningful recommendations reflect the deepening crisis in international relations and arms control. The PrepCom proceedings also served to highlight the growing chasm between the aspirations and ideas coming from a wide section of non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) and the five NPT nuclear-weapon States (NWS)...."

References: See the Acronym Institute's home page and Disarmament Diplomacy issue No. 37 for documents and Rebecca Johnson's commentary about the PrepCom.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Status: Of the nuclear weapons states, only Britain and France have ratified it. India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed it. A conference to accelerate ratification will be held in fall 1999. All five NPT nuclear weapon states as well as India are pursuing some form of "stockpile stewardship" programs (for more information, see SDA double issue vol. 6 no. 4/vol. 7 no. 1, October 1998). The United States and France are building huge laser fusion facilities designed to create thermonuclear explosions, even though Article I of the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions and obliges parties to prevent nuclear explosions within their jurisdictions. The ratification of the CTBT in the United States has been linked to implementation of an extensive stockpile stewardship program.

Implications: Failure of the CTBT to enter into force, continued pursuit of stockpile stewardship programs that involve design capability for new weapons, and the construction of laser fusion facilities designed to create explosions that would violate Article I are all undermining a long sought and hard won goal that is essential to achieving both enduring non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Comments: Stockpile stewardship programs as well as delay on the part of many countries, including the United States, in ratifying the CTBT is further eroding confidence that nuclear weapons states will meet their nuclear disarmament obligations.

References: See the websites of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and IEER.