• According to the Russian News Agency ITAR-TASS, several Russian politicians stated that Russian tactical nuclear weapons could be re-deployed in Belarus (March 25)

• The Ukraine parliament called for reversal of the country's non-nuclear status in response to NATO attacks on Yugoslavia (March 26)

• The United Nations Security Council rejected a Russian-sponsored resolution for the immediate cessation of the use of force against Yugoslavia and the urgent resumption of negotiations (March 26)

• A few days after the bombing started, Russia officially announced suspension of its cooperation with NATO by recalling Russian representatives from Brussels and asking NATO representatives to leave Moscow

• Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff, declared, "If the question of Russia's continued existence is raised, then everything that the Armed Forces possesses, including nuclear weapons, should be used" (March 31)

• Chairman Roman Popkovich of the Defense Committee of the Russian Duma proposed including the possibility of a first nuclear strike in the national security policy (March 31)

• Igor Sergeyev, Russian Defense Minister, stated, "In the developing situation, Russia will have to revise its plans for further reductions of the armed forces," Itar-TASS (April 7)

• The Russian Duma supported the idea of the unification of Russia with Yugoslavia, as proposed by Yugoslavian counterparts (vote 293 to 54) (April 16)

• Russia boycotted the NATO Summit

• "You have to understand that if we want to cause you a problem over this, we could. Someone, we don't know who, could send up a missile from a ship or a submarine and detonate a nuclear weapon high over the United States. The EMP [electromagnetic pulse that destroys electronic and computer equipment] would take away all your capability," Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Duma Committee on Foreign Relations, late April (as stated by U.S. congressman Curt Weldon in an May 18 speech)

• At a top-secret meeting of the Russian Security Council, President Yeltsin signed a decree committing to develop, deploy and use tactical weapons (April 29)

• "Just let Clinton, a little bit, accidentally, send a missile. We will answer immediately. Such impudence! To unleash a war on a sovereign state. Without Security Council. Without United Nations." Boris Yeltsin, Washington Post (May 7)

It is clear that the NATO decision to bomb Yugoslavia without a UN Security Council mandate has aggravated a nuclear situation that was retrogressing rapidly from the hopeful early years after the end of the Cold War. This nuclear crisis has become so serious so suddenly because the bypassing of the UN Security Council comes on top of a series of adverse developments. Several of these involve NATO and/or US commitments either under treaties or given to Russia as part of the winding down of the Cold War, as they have been and continue to be understood by Russians in and out of government.

For example, it is Russia's firm understanding, buttressed by Western sources, as the former US Ambassador to Russia Jack Matlock wrote in The New York Times in April 1999, that former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was given an understanding that NATO's borders would not be expanded to the East if Germany were allowed to unite with West Germany and a unified Germany were to stay in NATO. Yet NATO was enlarged without Soviet opposition after Germany was peacefully re-united.

Further, during debates on NATO enlargement, Russia was assured that NATO was a defensive transatlantic organization that would never undertake offensive military action against any sovereign country without a UN mandate (it was said by NATO officials that such an offensive action is constitutionally impossible). However this happened in the Yugoslavia case.

These developments have made it impossible for anyone in Russia to lend credibility to commitments given by NATO. Therefore, while NATO has stated several times it has no plans to station conventional or nuclear forces in the territories of new members, such assurances carry little, if any, weight in Russia.

NATO expansion has been especially troubling to Russians because about 150 US nuclear bombs and their associated bombers are still stationed in non-nuclear weapons states in Europe (see Table below). The fact that there is no formal agreement that would prevent these weapons from being moved into the territories of NATO's new members, much closer to the borders of Russia, has greatly increased Russian concerns. The stationing of these bombs in non-nuclear states is also questionable under Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibit nuclear weapons states from sharing nuclear weapons with non-nuclear states. The potential extension of nuclear sharing to new NATO members is especially objectionable under the NPT. How would the United States government react if Russia were to begin nuclear sharing agreements with other countries, especially if these agreements also included possible actions against third parties without any United Nations Security Council mandate?

All of these developments are further complicated and aggravated by the often-stated US desire to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system. These are provocative in the context of a world full of nuclear weapons because they can be considered part of a first strike strategy. Given that US verbal assurances now mean next to nothing in Russian political discourse, the US movement toward NMD deployment is especially de-stabilizing. If carried out without the explicit assent of Russia, an NMD system deployment that violates the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty in Russia's eyes could have nuclear repercussions every bit as serious as those of the NATO decision to bomb Yugoslavia without a UN mandate.

Those of us who have advocated nuclear disarmament in a climate that was already very difficult prior to March 24 now find the ground cut out from under our feet. Given the lack of any significant Russian conventional force capacity, NATO expansion and NATO's bypassing of the UN Security Council, there is little that anyone can do in Russia to roll back the new and larger role for Russian nuclear weapons unless the West takes initial steps that would be reassuring not only for the Russian government, but also for the Russian people.

A first step in that direction would be for the United States to remove the nuclear bombs that it has stationed in Europe back to its own territory. This would make the NATO expansion that has already occurred less threatening to Russia and create a new reality that would instill some confidence that there may be a desire on the part of the United States and its European allies to work with and not against Russia. This minimal step is necessary for the sake of nuclear safety and for the world's security. I hope that the United States will carry it out expeditiously.