IEER Science for Democratic Action Vol. 5 No. 1

A recent U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) decision to resume production of tritium, a radioactive gas contained in nuclear weapons, could have profound effects on non-proliferation efforts as well as serious environmental and health consequences. The DOE and the Pentagon claim the move is needed to ensure adequate quantities of tritium to support a 5,000 warhead arsenal after the year 2011. But woefully little public debate has preceded the assumption that the U.S. needs to maintain thousands of warheads for decades to come. Moreover, the DOE's decision does not seem to demonstrate good faith efforts toward nuclear disarmament, as required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It does not even take into account the minimum steps needed to reduce the danger of a black market in Russian tactical nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy has not had an operating tritium production facility since 1988 due to safety and health concerns at its aging facilities. Recently it has explored new production technologies and will investigate a commercial reactor option while funding accelerator research. The DOE is under pressure to consider a third option, the new so-called "triple play" reactor. In addition to producing tritium, such a reactor would use surplus military plutonium as fuel and would generate power for civilian consumption. The final decision is expected to be made in three years following the assessment of each approach. THE TWO BASIC NUCLEAR PROCESSES FOR PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM What is Tritium? Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen which has both commercial and military applications. Tritium's commercial uses include medical diagnostics and sign illumination, especially EXIT signs. However, commercial tritium use accounts for only a small fraction of the tritium used worldwide. Tritium's primary function is to boost the yield of both fission and thermonuclear weapons. Contained in removable and refillable reservoirs, tritium increases the efficiency of the use of nuclear materials in warheads. Tritium's relatively short half-life of 12.3 years and its low concentration in nature necessitate artificial production for use in warheads. Total U.S. tritium production since 1955 is estimated to be 225 kilograms, approximately 150 kilograms of which have decayed into helium-3, leaving a current inventory of approximately 75 kilograms.1 (Actual data are still classified.) In the United States, tritium has been produced in reactors operated for tritium and plutonium production. Health and Environmental Effects of Tritium Production Tritium contamination exists in the groundwater, surface water, and soil at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, among other sites, from both operational releases and accidents. Even in low concentrations, tritium has been linked to developmental problems, reproductive problems, genetic abnormalities, and other health problems in laboratory animals.2 Additionally, tritium may be linked to adverse health effects on populations near facilities which utilize tritium. (For example, an increased incidence of Down's Syndrome has been reported near the Darlington tritium extraction facility in Ontario, Canada.) Tritium most commonly enters the environment in gaseous form (T2) or as a replacement for one of the hydrogen atoms in water. This "tritiated water" (or HTO, instead of ordinary, non-radioactive H2O) can replace ordinary water in the soft tissue in the human body, approximately 70% of which is water. It can also enter fetuses through the placenta due to its similarities to ordinary water. Once in living cells, tritium can replace hydrogen in the organic molecules in the body. Thus, despite its low radiotoxicity in gaseous form3 and its tendency to pass out of the body rather rapidly as water, the health effects of tritium are made more severe by its property of being chemically identical to hydrogen. In addition to the health and environmental threats posed by tritium, normal operation of reactors generates a host of other toxic wastes, including spent fuel and other categories of radioactive and hazardous waste. Should the DOE decide to pursue the reactor option to produce tritium, it would generate from 68 to 105 metric tons of heavy metal in spent fuel per year. This would be added to about 2,700 metric tons of heavy metal in spent fuel that is in DOE's inventory. If DOE pursues an accelerator option, the facility would not produce spent fuel, but would still produce other waste products, including low-level radioactive waste. The coal or natural gas facility needed to power the accelerator would also create environmental problems, including emissions of sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen oxides. These pollutants contribute to the problems of acid rain and global warming and have adverse health effects.4 Still, according to the DOE, the environmental effects of accelerator production of tritium would be less than those from a reactor. This factor contributed to DOE's decision to designate the accelerator as one of its preferred options for tritium production. How Much Tritium Do We Need? The amount of tritium required by the DOE and the Department of Defense for the nuclear weapons stockpile is determined by several factors, including the amount of tritium needed per warhead, the tritium tied up in the "tritium pipeline,"5 and the size of the nuclear arsenal. Of these, the size of the nuclear arsenal has the most direct effect on the amount of tritium required. Over the years, the arsenal size that the Pentagon considers adequate to fulfill its requirements has varied widely. For example, in 1954 the Strategic Air Command estimated that after an attack of just 600-750 warheads, "virtually all of Russia would be nothing but a smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours."6 Later in the Cold War, the number of targets proliferated, especially with the addition of Soviet warheads, missiles, and leadership and command structures as targets. The number of strategic targets in the National Strategic Targeting Database doubled from 25,000 to 50,000 between 1980 and 1985. The end of the Cold War brought changes in the Pentagon's requirements. Between 1990 and 1992 the Pentagon's "minimum" requirement fell from over 10,000 to 3,500 strategic warheads. Currently, no role has been established for nuclear weapons in post-Cold War military and foreign policy, so there is no generally agreed upon "minimum" for strategic warheads. DOE's estimate of 5,000 warheads necessitates a new tritium production facility by 2011. But by decreasing the stockpile to 1,000 warheads a new tritium facility would not be needed until approximately 2024. If the stockpile were reduced further and the tritium pipeline upgraded, a new facility may not be needed until the middle of the next century or beyond. Reducing the Minimum Requirement Reduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons (such as nuclear landmines and neutron bombs) formed a large portion of the nuclear arsenal during the Cold War. But due to their portability, these weapons pose high security risks, particularly in Russia, where the danger of a black market in tactical warheads is fueled by a poor economic situation and concerns over nuclear safeguards at Russian facilities. This has already led the U.S. and Russia to withdraw most tactical weapons from deployment pursuant to a 1991 initiative by President Bush taken explicitly to reduce black market threats. In order to persuade Russia to eliminate its tactical stockpile, the United States must take the initiative by dismantling the rest of its tactical stockpile. Eliminating the approximately 1,000 tactical warheads (950 active plus spares) scheduled to remain in the U.S. arsenal would delay a tritium decision by three or four years. Minimum Deterrence. Many analysts, some with extensive military planning experience, advocate a theory known as "minimum deterrence." This theory assumes that a country will not risk an attack on the United States if the U.S. arsenal is powerful enough to inflict unacceptable damage and fatalities in a retaliatory attack. Proponents of minimum deterrence postulate that the U.S. could pose a credible second strike threat with anywhere from one to 1,000 invulnerable warheads, thus allowing significant reductions in its nuclear arsenal. Since a single warhead would devastate the capital of any country, there is no credible argument for hundreds, much less thousands, of warheads for such a purpose. Advocates of minimum deterrence include former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; Jonathon Dean, Ambassador to the Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction Talks; and Herbert York, first director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Adherence to the NPT. Tritium production would be an entirely academic discussion in the event that the U.S. and other weapons powers decide to honor their commitments under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which states: Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The "Principles and Objectives For Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," a final document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, reaffirmed this commitment. However, the sole purpose of a new tritium facility would be to maintain a nuclear weapons stockpile well into the next century. Current Department of Defense and DOE planning ignores stockpile reductions below the 3,500 warheads allowed by the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). Establishing the infrastructure to maintain a large U.S. arsenal would most likely be seen as a violation of the spirit of the NPT and would raise objections by non-nuclear NPT signatories. The Non-Aligned Movement, consisting of over 100 member-states of the United Nations, has taken a strong stand for disarmament, asserting during the NPT Review and Extension Conference that nuclear weapons states "...should reaffirm their commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."7 Delaying plans for new tritium production would demonstrate good faith efforts on the part of the U.S. towards nuclear disarmament. Negotiations toward START III would be widely seen as further good faith efforts by the nuclear powers. Recommendations The future role of nuclear weapons should not be driven by a narrow technocratic decision on tritium. Rather, a broad national debate is needed on this crucial subject. We recommend that: The plans for a new tritium source should be put on hold and an informed public debate over the size and function of the nuclear stockpile should precede any decision on tritium production. The U.S. should persuade Russia to eliminate its remaining tactical nuclear warheads by unilaterally eliminating its own remaining tactical warheads. Nuclear weapons states should take concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament, as required by the NPT. A first step would be for the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals to around 1,000, roughly the same number as that of the other three powers combined. The U.S. Department of Energy should declassify tritium inventory and use numbers.

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