From April 17-May 12, 1995, 174 of the 178 states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) assembled at the United Nations to review the Treaty and to decide upon its permanence. On May 11, 1995 the body reached agreement by consensus that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely. In addition to the decision on extension, two other decisions on the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" shaped the outcome of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The Debate Takes Shape

In the first few weeks of the conference, various sides of the extension debate emerged. One voice in the debate, made up of mostly western nations, and led by the five nuclear weapon states, advocated an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, a strong supporter of indefinite extension, told the conference body that the Treaty was fulfilling its role of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and has created a "favorable climate for a continuously broadened international cooperation in the use of the atom for peaceful purposes." U.S. Vice President Al Gore, the highest ranking official at the conference, also pushed for unconditional indefinite extension, stating that the nuclear weapon states are on track in fulfilling their NPT obligations. He drew the signatories' attention to such U.S. policy successes as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

Indefinite extension proponents also expressed that a world without the NPT would be extremely unsafe, as it is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. Gore likened a vote in favor of rolling extension to, "a decision right now to terminate the Treaty," which would cause the NPT regime to fall apart. By the end of the first week of the conference, 92 states were on record as supporting indefinite NPT extension.

Several countries within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group of over 100 developing nations, presented another side of the debate by speaking out against unconditional indefinite extension. One of the main objections lodged against indefinite extension was that it made permanent the inequality inherent in the Treaty between the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states. Ambassador Izhar Ibrahim of Indonesia advanced this view in stating that "indefinite extension would mean the permanent legitimization of nuclear weapons and the five privileged powers..." Many non-nuclear weapon states assumed that if the status-quo was maintained indefinitely, they would lose whatever leverage they had to keep the nuclear powers in check.

The many voices against indefinite extension did not translate into a united front for any particular extension option. Within the anti-indefinite camp, there emerged several proposals. For example, Indonesia and Myanmar called for a "rolling extension of successive fixed periods," without a specific period duration. Nigeria proposed a "single fixed period" option, not specifying duration and suggesting the possibility of renewal. There was also the offering by Egypt and Syria for conference suspension, so that the extension decision could be taken after certain conditions had been met. One of the main conditions for Egypt was that Israel, considered a de-facto nuclear weapon state, join the Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state before it was extended indefinitely.

U.S. Lobbying Effort

There were several factors that contributed to the outcome of the conference. The United States and several other western nations launched an intense lobbying effort in the weeks prior to the NPT Review and Extension Conference, with the goal of convincing as many nations as possible to support unconditional indefinite extension. In meetings with foreign officials, U.S. representatives spread the word that a vote against indefinite extension could mean soured relations with the United States. In some instances, as was the case with Egypt, the vote was linked to more tangible items such as foreign aid. Venezuelan Ambassador Adolfo Taylhardat told the New York Times on May 14 that, "Many countries have been submitted to these pressures. If all the countries of the conference had the opportunity to express their views freely, indefinite extension would never have won."

In line with what some NPT delegates have referred to as its' "strong-arm" strategy, the United States showed support for a roll-call vote in regards to the extension decision, arguing that an open ballot was essential for accountability. Many Non-Aligned members wanted the vote to be secret, so that states opposing indefinite extension would not feel pressured into changing their vote in order to avoid a backlash by certain countries, notably the United States. Though the final decision was made by consensus, the open versus closed vote debate was highly symbolic of the dynamic that had developed between the different factions.

Indefinite Extension Proponents Fail to Reach Agreement

The inability of indefinite extension opponents to speak with a unified voice also influenced the conference results. This lack of consistency was clearly illustrated when Foreign Ministers within the Non-Aligned Movement, meeting in Bandung for the Foreign Ministers' Conference on April 27, 1995 - seen as the last hope for this movement to join forces - failed to unite around one extension plan.

Realizing they could not agree and in the hopes of achieving as much commitment for future implementation as possible, the Non-Aligned Movement began to focus their energies on the NPT review process rather than the extension decision. Many non-nuclear weapon states concluded that if debate over one extension option or another continued, sufficient attention would not be paid to other important issues, most importantly the Treaty review process and future accountability.

As the west had less to gain from a shift in the status-quo, the non-nuclear weapon states knew that if they did not make a case for accountability, it would probably go unaddressed. Specifically, the majority of indefinite extension opponents wanted to ensure that the nuclear weapon states would fulfill their Article VI disarmament obligations, that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be reached by a specified date, and that a global fissile material cut-off would be achieved. Without the leverage they perceived would be gained from a strengthened review process, several non-nuclear weapon states believed they would eventually lose on these issues, in addition to the extension decision.

South Africa Toes the Line

This shift in priorities found a voice in South Africa's proposal to the conference body. By coming out in support of indefinite extension, while proposing concrete points to strengthen the review process, South Africa acted as the bridge between the two sides of the extension debate. Several factors contributed to South Africa's unique position within the Review and Extension Conference. On the nuclear front, it is one of the only nations to have dismantled its own nuclear weapons program. In regards to its place in the global community, it maintains strong ties with several Non-Aligned countries, but also seeks financial assistance from the west. Because of its unique status, states on all sides of the debate were carefully watching South Africa's positioning.

South Africa proposed several concrete steps for strengthening the review process that took the form of two documents: "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" and "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament." Both were fleshed out by a group of delegates organized by conference President Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and agreed upon by the conference body.

The "Review" document continues the practice of holding review conferences every five years, with preparatory committees being held every year in the three years leading up to the conference.(1) The purpose of these meetings is to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty, particularly those points laid out in "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament." "Principles" commits all parties to a "programme of action" including: the completion of a CTBT by 1996; the "early conclusion" of a cutoff of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes; and "the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systemic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."

Though the actions called for in "Principles" are not legally binding, they were viewed as a way for the non-nuclear weapon states to maintain some leverage over the nuclear weapon states. The nuclear weapon states accepted them because they allowed for a compromise to be made, which led to a consensus on indefinite extension. Their success in weakening the language of the original "Principles" also made the nuclear weapon states more willing to accept this document. For example, "clear-cut language to complete CTBT negotiations this year and have the treaty signed in 1996" was modified to read: "a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable" treaty "no later than 1996." This language pushed back the negotiation deadline a year and inserted difficult to achieve modifiers, such as 'universal.'(2)

Looking Ahead: Promises Unfulfilled?

Will the commitments laid out in "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" be fulfilled by the Treaty signatories, particularly the nuclear weapon states? Was the shift in priorities from extension to review on the part of several Non-Aligned states wise? If nuclear arms related events in the month since the conference are any indication of the nuclear weapon states' true intentions concerning their disarmament commitments, the Non-Aligned Movement may have paid a higher price than they originally suspected.

• Within two days of the extension decision, China conducted a nuclear test;

• Within a month of the extension decision, France announced that in September it would resume underground nuclear testing;

• The Department of Energy is seeking to restart tritium production activities.(3)

Steps that allow for weapons design and modification purposes -- such as the Chinese test and France's decision to resume testing -- are contrary to the spirit of the NPT, as is U.S. construction of its Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrotest (DARHT) facility, an advanced hydrodynamic testing facility currently under construction at Los Alamos.(4) The capabilities provided by DARHT could possibly provide far more data for warhead design.

Thus, despite steps nuclear weapon states have taken to fulfill their Article VI obligations (for example, START I and II, and Russia's agreement to shut down its plutonium production reactors by 2000), a path to global nuclear disarmament has yet to emerge. Actions by the nuclear weapon states, not only over the last month, but over the last few decades, remind us that it is the determination of the non nuclear weapon states and the NGO community that will create such a path. The five year review meetings called for under the "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty," will also be critical to this success.