On January 20th and 21st, 1995, over seventy participants from fourteen countries assembled in New York to discuss plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) at a symposium hosted by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. The participants represented citizens' groups, research centers, universities, foundations, and the media. Three main topics were discussed:

Fissile materials and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
There was agreement among participants that Article IV of the NPT, which encourages the sharing of nuclear technology, including the technology to separate plutonium, is incompatible with the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation. Participants also criticized the failure of nuclear weapon states to meet their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty, and especially their failure to achieve a cut-off of fissile material production. There was disagreement among participants about whether the fissile material cut-off negotiations in Geneva should include stockpile declarations and whether a cut-off of only military production would be a useful measure. It was pointed out that the NPT review and extension conference in New York could provide an opportunity to raise awareness of fissile materials issues.

Fissile materials in Russia
Four Russian citizens spoke about the health and environmental costs of reprocessing in Russia and about the security of fissile materials in Russia. They said that information on Russia's nuclear past, such as underground injections of radioactive waste, is beginning to come to light, but they also pointed out that citizens still have a very difficult time obtaining basic information about nuclear facilities. Several of the Russian speakers were concerned about the incomplete RT-2 reprocessing plant in Krasnoyarsk. Construction of the plant was recently suspended due to a lack of funds, but a Presidential decree would allow resumption if Russia can find the funds. Russian citizens were concerned that RT-2 would cause environmental damage and could increase proliferation threats from plutonium. The Russian presentations were followed by a general discussion about what activists and governments around the world can do to improve the security of fissile materials in Russia.

The civilian plutonium programs of Japan, Britain, France, and India
Speakers from each of the four countries outlined their country's current plutonium policies and plans for future plutonium utilization. All of the speakers cited the wasteful economics of plutonium use, and speakers from Japan, Britain, and India discussed the weapons-potential of their country's civilian plutonium programs. There was strong agreement that international cooperation among NGOs is necessary to counter the powerful political and financial interests backing the plutonium programs. Many participants also felt that if NGOs are to oppose plutonium use they should propose viable energy alternatives. This would involve researching other energy sources and preparing an independent economic analysis of the energy economies in the countries with civilian plutonium programs.

In general, participants concurred that plutonium represents a security, economic, and environmental liability. Many of the participants signed IEER's Declaration on the Liabilities of Plutonium, which was delivered to official delegates at the NPT Prepcom.

A summary of the proceedings is available from IEER.

Comments to Outreach Coordinator: ieer@ieer.org
Takoma Park, Maryland, USA

Last updated: August, 1996