Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
SDA Volume 3, Number 3
The NPT is a collection of eleven articles designed to prevent new countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, to promote disarmament, and to establish a system for safeguards and verification. The treaty codifies a bargain struck between two types of states -- the nuclear weapon "haves" and "have-nots." In return for forgoing nuclear weapons development and possession, non-nuclear countries were offered access to civilian nuclear technology. The transfer of that technology was to be closely controlled and monitored. The treaty formally limits possession of nuclear weapons to the five states that possessed them by 1964, and thus legitimizes that possession.
Some of the strengths and weaknesses of the treaty are reflected in the history of its formation. In the 1960s, wary of what seemed like an inevitable spread of nuclear weapons, the U.S. and the Soviet Union started the treaty process from a position of power and a legacy of secrecy. The main motivations of the three nuclear weapons states who signed the NPT (the U.S., Soviet Union, and U.K.) were to retain close control of nuclear weapons and to profit from the sale of civilian nuclear technology. These ideas were based on President Eisenhower's 1953 "Atoms for Peace" program in which the U.S. offered civilian technology to those states that would refrain from nuclear weapons development.
The NPT thus emphasized a program of non-proliferation based on denial, limiting the supply of nuclear weapons and technologies, rather than on the demand. In other words, instead of decreasing their own nuclear forces in order to lessen the desire for nuclear weapons on the part of other states, the haves decided to hold on to their weapons and try to prevent other states from obtaining or building them. They concentrated on horizontal proliferation, which refers to the spread of arms or technology from country to country, as opposed to vertical proliferation, in which a given country increases the number or sophistication of its weapons1. In this way, the haves could continue to research and develop their own nuclear weapons without violating the letter of the treaty.
It seemed reasonable to ask the have-nots to forgo nuclear weapons production in return for "peaceful" nuclear energy technology, liberally granted fron the haves (under Article IV). "You can have all the reactors you want," the treaty said in effect, "but you should not acquire nuclear weapons." Non-nuclear weapon states, concerned that the treaty divested them of potential military power in the face of five nuclear-armed nations, were determined to balance the treaty with some checks upon the nuuclear weapons states. The have-nots, with strength in numbers, were able to add Article VI to the treaty, requiring the haves to:
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on treaty on general and complete disarmament.
The meaning of an "early date" is undefined. The treaty's preamble also calls for a conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but again, no time-frame is given. Even with its weaknesses, Article VI is extremely important. It is the only time that all five declared nuclear weapon states have formally agreed to work toward complete nuclear disarmament. It is also important because, if these states live up to their obligations under Article VI, de-facto nuclear states that have not signed the NPT would be much more likely to disarm and join the treaty. India and Pakistan, for example, may agree to join a global disarmament treaty if China does so. Article VI thus points the way to complete and total global disarmament, not just among the five declared nuclear states.
The extension conference of the NPT in 1995 comes at a crucial political juncture, when the Cold War arrangements of political and military influence in the world have broken down but new ones have not yet been established. Whether we achieve an historic new course to disarmament or not depends in part on extending the NPT in a manner that encourages both disarmament and non-proliferation.
There are three options facing NPT signatories for the extension conference: extending the treaty indefinitely, for one fixed period, or for rolling fixed periods. A decision will be reached by consensus or by a majority vote of NPT signatories. At least 86 votes will be required to choose an option.
Option 1: Indefinite Extension
Under this option, the NPT would remain in force indefinitely or until another treaty could take its place. Such unlimited duration is advocated by the U.S., NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Group of Seven, the European Union, the South Pacific Forum, and the Secretary General of the United Nations. It is opposed by many non-nuclear weapon states and the "non-aligned movement," which consists mainly of countries in the Third World that did not want (or proclaimed they did not want) to align their foreign policies with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union.
The Clinton administration has expressed strong support for indefinite extension. Thomas Graham, Jr., acting deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and a key player in negotiations for indefinite extension at the upcoming conference, firmly supports this option. In an interview with Arms Control Today (July/August 1994), he explained his position.
The NPT...is the only international arms control agreement of significance that does not have unlimited duration...It is important to make this treaty permanent so as to eliminate the tendency for countries to do worst-case planning and, as a result, possibly pursue nuclear weapons programs because they assume that the treaty might someday end.
Though Graham's argument is a strong one, it fails to give the entire picture. While the NPT may lessen the need for worst case planning, it currently does not altogether eliminate this need since a country could withdraw with three months notice. Moreover, the disadvantages of indefinite extension, especially the lack of pressure on nuclear weapon states to disarm, far outweigh the advantage that Graham cited.
There are a number of obstacles to achieving an indefinite extension. For example, Arab nations may not vote for indefinite extension if Israel (a non-signatory) continues to be able to make and possess nuclear weapons unchallenged. The key obstacle to indefinite extension, however, will be the skepticism of non-nuclear weapon states that the nuclear weapon powers have actually changed their ways.
While the five declared nuclear weapon states have taken some positive steps to reduce nuclear weapons, they have neither developed a plan for disarmament nor a timetable for it. Currently, there is little likelihood for total and complete disarmament, because none of the military postures of the five nuclear states contemplates a strategy in which they themselves would not have these weapons.
The U.S. still does not support Geneva negotiations for a treaty to outlaw the first use of nuclear weapons against states that have no nuclear weapons. Russia recently retreated from its 1978 no-first-use pledge. Moreover, the U.S. did not seriously consider a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) until recently, under pressure expressed clearly in the 1990 NPT review conference by the non-nuclear states.4 Four of the big five nuclear weapon states adopted a testing moratorium, but China continues to test and the U.S. wants to continue laboratory scale testing (hydronuclear testing).
In sum, the non-nuclear weapon states have ample reason to think that indefinite extension could mean a corresponding indefinite postponement of universal nuclear disarmament. This would defeat one central purpose of the treaty, and in our view, the most important long-term goal.
Option 2: A Single Extension of the Treaty
This option would define a limited time period during which the treaty would remain in effect. At the end of that period the treaty would end with no opportunity for extension. There are two potential purposes of this type of extension. Either a new treaty could be negotiated to replace the NPT, or the treaty would be allowed to expire. Periods ranging from five to twenty five years have been proposed.
One of the most serious disadvantages to this option is that if no new treaty were put into place during the extension, then at the end of the period the world would be left with no legal instrument for either horizontal non-proliferation or disarmament. On the other hand, this possibility might provide the means to pressure the nuclear weapon states to work effectively toward a meaningful disarmament and safeguards treaty.
Option 3: Rolling Extension
This third option would allow the have-nots to try to reduce the more contentious, discriminatory elements of the treaty by insisting on meaningful progress towards disarmament. It would also create a process for moving toward a new treaty, without running the risk of losing a non-proliferation/disarmament regime altogether. Although there is not yet agreement on the mechanics of this option, most analysts agree that it would automatically extend the treaty at the end of each extension period until signatories decided the treaty should expire.
In the unlikely event that signatories do not achieve a majority vote for one of the three options outlined above, then no outcome is immediately clear from the language of the treaty since there is no provision for plurality. According to one analyst, "at least some scholars. . . have argued that the treaty would technically continue to remain in force until an agreement is reached. The treaty would obviously not carry much weight without [majority] support."5
If the treaty were to expire, it would mean that all obligations under the treaty for non-proliferation, CTBT, disarmament, and inspections, as well as for promotion of nuclear technology, would lapse. The safeguards and inspection role of the IAEA, for example, would be brought into question.
As the extension conference approaches, proponents of indefinite extension recount the accomplishments of the treaty with an almost awed reverence. The NPT has served the vital purpose of curbing new weapons programs and has complemented arms reduction treaties such as START I and START II. It has also created a means by which the international community can come together and discuss difficult security issues. And review and extension conferences provide the political opportunities for universal nuclear disarmament even though the NPT itself cannot be amended in any meaningful way.
But the NPT has had its share of weaknesses. Iraq was able to develop a nuclear weapons program while it was a signatory to the NPT and while under IAEA inspections. North Korea highlighted the possibility of a country obtaining "civilian" nuclear technology under the NPT -- technology that can be used for nuclear weapons -- and then withdrawing from the treaty. North Korea has used threats of withdrawal from the treaty to extract concessions from other countries.
In addition, countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa were not convinced that the NPT could provide for their security and developed nuclear weapons outside the treaty. The U.S.-Soviet arms race and the high value that the five declared states placed on their nuclear weapons exacerbated the worries of these countries. India apparently felt that it could not abstain from developing nuclear weapons with a nuclear-armed China at its border. Delegitimizing nuclear weapons and negotiating a global disarmament treaty as required under Article VI would do much to allay the security concerns of these and other countries.
Finally, the NPT is not the only way to achieve non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Brazil and Argentina, for example, decided to forego nuclear weapons and set up an inspection regime outside the NPT framework.
The indefinite extension that the five declared haves seek would tend to cement existing power relationships, weaken the treaty, and damage international trust and relations. According to George Bunn of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University:
achieving a bare majority for an indefinite extension might be counterproductive: the losers might go home mad even withdraw from the treaty. Since the NPT's effectiveness depends so much on the widest possible consensus, a narrow victory leaving many angry losers should be avoided.6
Moreover, indefinitely extending the treaty would remove direct pressure on nuclear weapon states to move toward disarmament.
A better course would extend the treaty with an eye to developing a new treaty enforcing full disarmament. The road to such a treaty is not an easy one; the have-nots will expect the nuclear weapon states to accomplish several important measures to level the playing field. These include extending the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and successfully negotiating the CTBT, adopting the no-first-use policy, fully complying with START arms reduction treaties, and adopting a ban on weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium that are used in nuclear warheads). The pressure also exists for creating a definite timetable and commitments for nuclear disarmament.
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
Comments toOutreach Coordinator: ieer@ieer.org
Takoma Park, Maryland, USA
Last updated: September 1996