• Beyond the Nuclear Bargain
  
• The Nuclear Weapon Haves and the Have- Nots
  
• Why Opt for Rolling Extension?
  

Analysis: This article perpetuates the division of countries into nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states and as such is inherently discriminatory. By direct or indirect assistance, these articles have been breached. For example, Iraq developed its nuclear weapons program while it was still a signatory to the NPT. Moreover, nuclear weapon states may abet the manufacture of nuclear weapons, either unwittingly or intentionally, since some peaceful technologies may be applied for military purposes (see Article IV). Finally, a nuclear weapon is not clearly defined in the treaty. States can obtain all necessary components to build a weapon but not violate the treaty unless they assemble the parts.²

Article III
Text summary: This article empowers the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) both to promote nuclear energy and to monitor nuclear exports and activities by way of inspections and accounting of nuclear materials ("safeguards").

Analysis: The IAEA cannot impose sanctions and is limited in the scope of investigations it can conduct. Unlike the have-not signatories, the nuclear weapon states are not required to undergo IAEA inspection, though recently four of the five have begun a very limited voluntary program to do so.

Article IV
Text summary: This article sanctions and encourages the international transfer of civilian nuclear technology (e.g. for nuclear energy).

Analysis: Article IV is designed as the carrot to prevent the build-up of military nuclear programs by promoting civilian ones. The problem with Article IV is that civilian nuclear technology can be diverted to military nuclear technology. Many types of civilian technology, especially reprocessing plants to extract plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel, are identical to those needed in a nuclear weapons program.

Article V
Text summary: This article asserts the right of non-nuclear weapon states to conduct "peaceful nuclear explosions," or PNEs. These explosions are intended for civil purposes such as building canals or harbors, or exploring for natural gas.

Analysis: Included as a perk for the have-nots, Article V backfired in 1974 when India (a non-signatory) tested a nuclear explosive, claiming it was a PNE. The article is widely regarded as outdated and against the spirit of a hoped-for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Article VI
Text summary: This article charges all signatories to the treaty with ending the nuclear arms race and moving toward disarmament. It also calls for a future treaty on "general and complete" disarmament.

Analysis: This is the article that requires progress on disarmament. However, there is no time frame given in the article for disarmament or a future treaty; there are no milestones to mark progress; and there are no sanctions for failure to achieve disarmament.

Article VII
Text summary: The NPT will not bar signatories from entering into regional treaties.

Analysis: This article recognizes the importance of regional treaties for strengthening the NPT. The treaty of Tlatelolco, for example, is well on the way to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Article VIII
Text summary: This article outlines the amendment process. In order to amend the NPT, one third of treaty signatories must request a special conference. The amendment will pass if it receives a majority of votes. Those allowed to vote are NPT signatories and the Board of Governors of the IAEA. If the majority ratifies the amendment then it will enter into force, but only for those parties that ratified it.

Analysis: An amendment conference would most likely be called by non-weapon states. Since the nuclear weapon states would be unlikely to ratify an amendment that they did not support, and since the amendment would only be binding on those signatories that ratified it, then a given amendment would either have to be watered down for the nuclear weapon states to ratify it, or it would remain a strong amendment but not binding on the nuclear states. The treaty is widely seen as practically impossible to amend.

Article X
Text summary: This article allows a signatory to withdraw from the treaty with three months advance notice when "supreme interests" are threatened. It also calls for a 25 year extension conference.

Analysis: There is no definition of "supreme interests." As a result, a signatory can obtain all the materials necessary to make nuclear weapons, then withdraw, claiming that "supreme interests" are involved, without violating the treaty.

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research

Comments toOutreach Coordinator: ieer@ieer.org
Takoma Park, Maryland, USA

Last updated: September 1996