Actual developments in Japan, however, show that this policy, intended to constitute the basis of a nuclear back-end policy, deviates largely from reality. According to government statistics, the cumulative amount of spent fuel discharged from light water reactors (LWRs) was 10,400 metric tons as of the end of FY 1994 (March 31, 1995), and the current rate of discharge is about 1000 metric tons annually. The Tokai plant is operating at pilot plant capacity, and had reprocessed a total of 864 metric tons by the end of FY 1995.

Given the limited capacity of the Tokai plant together with Japan's policy that no new contracts be made with overseas reprocessors, Japan cannot reprocess all of its accumulated spent fuel. Even if the Rokkasho plant starts full commercial operation in the mid-2000s as planned, the plant's reprocessing capacity of 800 metric tons and storage capacity of 3000 metric tons of heavy metal will absorb only a small portion of the accumulated spent fuel along with that which will be discharged annually.

Furthermore, the soaring cost estimate of the Rokkasho plant makes the future of its construction very uncertain. JNFL's latest estimation of the construction costs is 1.88 trillion yen (about $17 billion), including the liquid high-level waste vitrification facility-up to 7 times more than the costs of its European counterparts. It is possible that construction work will be postponed after the completion of a spent fuel storage pool, expected in 1997.

When viewed from the plutonium demand side, the central government and utilities face a serious surplus problem. Japan's ambitious plutonium program has been suffering from technical, economic and political difficulties. Strong concerns over security and safety, both international and domestic, were aroused when the Akatsuki-maru ship carried 1.5 metric tons of plutonium from France to Japan. In 1995, Japanese utilities forced the government to scrap the MOX-fueled Ohma advanced thermal reactor (ATR) project on economic grounds. A sodium leakage accident at the fast breeder reactor (FBR) Monju on December 8, 1995 dealt a severe blow to the government plutonium program. Japan's entire FBR program has since been postponed, perhaps indefinitely.

The government plans to consume most of the plutonium separated in Europe as MOX fuel in LWRs, in order to maintain the pledged "no-(plutonium) stockpile policy." But, the MOX use program could also be substantially deferred due to the opposition of local governments. In that case Japan's already large separated plutonium surplus in Europe of 8.7 metric tons (as of the end of 1994) would increase to 20-25 metric tons by the turn of the century.

Japanese reprocessing policy now faces a curious contradiction. On the one hand, Japan is confronted with a shortage of spent fuel reprocessing capacity. On the other hand, it is suffering from an increasing surplus of plutonium. The reprocessing-based nuclear fuel cycle/back-end policy is becoming more and more controversial and is losing its justification. The only way to get out of this difficulty is a thorough reconsideration of the reprocessing policy to prevent a further build up of surplus separated plutonium.

Jinzaburo Takagi is the executive director of the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center in Tokyo.