Editorial

International Implications of US Reprocessing

by Lydia Popova

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In the fall of 1995, the environmental community in Russia learned about the letter sent by Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Chairman John Conway to Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary in support of reprocessing as a method of spent fuel management. The start up of reprocessing at the Savannah River site in February 1996 was perceived by the Russian community as a confirmation of the U.S. government's intention to reconsider the policy on reprocessing adopted under President Jimmy Carter. It was a cause for celebration for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry (Minatom) and a great disappointment for environmentalists and those concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Seeing an American promote reprocessing creates great concern and confusion in Russia because it encourages individuals in Minatom in their support for reprocessing. Minatom officials use many deceptive arguments to defend the Russian reprocessing program. They claim that reprocessing is the best method for management of spent nuclear fuel. This is not true, as reprocessing is currently based on the outdated PUREX technology, which produces large volumes of hard-to-handle liquid radioactive waste. It is now well-known that alternatives exist, and many countries have decided to explore them. Minatom also claims that reprocessing is economical because it recovers plutonium, which can be used to fuel reactors, including a new generation of breeder reactors. But currently it is much cheaper and safer to use enriched uranium as a reactor fuel. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War there is a surplus of uranium, which can be used to fuel reactors if necessary-so much that Russia is sending some of it to the United States. Construction of a new reprocessing plant in Russia, RT-2, which was started in early 1980s and then halted due to public opposition and financial difficulties, cannot be resumed without foreign investment. Minatom officials hoped to find customers for reprocessing at RT-2 by offering them favourable terms. But even under these terms Germany and Switzerland have decided not to send spent fuel from their reactors and not to invest into the construction of RT-2. Breeder technology is too expensive and has not been proven safe. Reprocessing becomes even more expensive if environmental and health standards are followed properly by industry. In addition, uranium that is extracted during reprocessing is contaminated by isotopes uranium-232 and 236, limiting its potential for re-use. This makes the concept of a closed nuclear fuel cycle quite vulnerable. Extracted plutonium creates more environmental, health and proliferation problems than can be justified by its economic advantages. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. government rejected commercial reprocessing primarily for non-proliferation reasons. Now the Department of Energy says that it will do a limited amount of reprocessing for environmental reasons, but will not reprocess any kind of spent fuel either from commercial or military reactors. Since this policy was first announced under President Bush, and then continued by President Clinton, it does not appear to be based on political grounds. In a true market economy reprocessing becomes uncompetitive. Nevertheless, reprocessing is promoted not only in Russia, which is making its first steps in the market, but also in the U.S., which is often referred to as an example of a model market economy. Clearly, initiatives for reprocessing in both countries come from experts who inherited the same Cold War mentality, as there does not appear to be any logical technical or economic reason for promotion of reprocessing. Those who seek to win jobs and political support at Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk and Chelyabinsk in Russia are relying on the same unnecessary and dangerous technology that supports government jobs in South Carolina in the U.S. Both our countries bear the environmental and health burden of the Cold War legacy. We believe that our scientists can find truly safe and environmentally friendly technologies to handle spent fuel, if they work together. If politicians in our countries really want to help their people, funds and resources should be directed to these efforts, not to the use of the PUREX process. Nuclear experts claim that no viable technical alternatives to reprocessing currently exist for types of spent fuel with very thin cladding, which pose problems for safe storage. Minatom officials and experts now refer to renewed operation of the reprocessing plant in Savannah River Site as a confirmation of this claim. We believe that nuclear engineers both in the United States and in Russia are smart enough to develop an alternative to reprocessing to stabilize the spent fuel which would produce less waste, cost less, and which would not create unnecessary and dangerous stocks of fissile materials. The costs to humankind of pursuing a regime of non-proliferation are great, in terms of material, financial and intellectual resources. Even the Non-Proliferation Treaty cannot guarantee that other nations will not join the five declared nuclear powers. Reprocessing, a technology for separation of plutonium that can be used in weapons, is a standing temptation for governments who seek nuclear weapons. Reprocessing should not be supported either in the U.S. or in Russia, if for no other reason than the signal it sends to other countries who look to us for technical guidance. Would our governments have all states follow their example? Lydia Popova is the director of the center for Nuclear Eclogy and Energy Policy of the Socio-Ecological Union in Moscow.

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October, 1997