Reprocessing defined

The vast majority of power reactors today are fuelled with enriched uranium. The energetic, or fissile, uranium (uranium-235) is irradiated and fissioned in the reactor to generate heat. Over a period of three to five years, the fissile content of the fuel is gradually depleted. This depleted or spent fuel routinely needs to be replaced with fresh fuel. Hot and highly radioactive spent fuel is therefore discharged from the reactor. The heat and radioactivity are generated by the decay of new radioactive materials produced during nuclear power production.

Following discharge from the reactor, the spent fuel must be stored securely, usually under water, to allow it to cool. There are two alternative routes for spent fuel management over the longer term. Either the fuel can continue to be stored, and perhaps eventually disposed of as a waste (direct disposal), or the fuel can be chemically processed to separate out its constituent parts (the "closed" cycle). Reprocessing is the chemical separation of plutonium (0.2 to 1 percent by weight) and uranium (95-96 percent) from the fission products and other long-lived wastes (3-4 percent) contained in spent nuclear fuel. Cumulatively, about one-third of spent fuel discharged from power reactors has been reprocessed to date, the remainder has been placed in long-term storage pending final disposal.

Justifications for reprocessing

To tell the story of how civilian reprocessing has evolved it is necessary to know not only about the technological and industrial context, but also about the assumptions and beliefs which have powered the whole enterprise. Nuclear reprocessing is the quintessential 'big' technology. For instance, the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield in the United Kingdom took 20 years from planning to execution. The total capital cost of the plant was about $4 billion. Big technologies require strong rationales. Over time, as conditions and perceptions change, these rationales are also forced to change.

Justifications for civilian reprocessing fall roughly into three time periods. During the early period stretching from the 1960s to the mid-1970s, reprocessing was considered the only viable management option for most spent fuel types. Plutonium recycling in fast neutron ("breeder") reactors was regarded as an essential feature of the long-term growth of nuclear power, providing energy security in an age of energy scarcity. Recycling plutonium in this way would unlock the energy potential of the more abundant uranium-238 which does not fission in significant amount in conventional reactors.

In the second period, from the mid-1970s to the late-1980s, the economic and strategic case for reprocessing gradually unravelled. Nuclear power grew more slowly than expected and uranium, far from being scarce, turned out to be relatively abundant. Low uranium prices undermined the economic case for plutonium whose real cost increased greatly due to escalations in the price of reprocessing. Meanwhile, although huge amounts of public money was spent on research and development, breeder reactor commercialization remained a distant dream, primarily because of the great technical difficulties involved. During this period, the proliferation risks of the 'plutonium economy' became a serious international issue. Since the mid-1970s, the United States has had a de facto policy opposing civilian reprocessing. Justifications for reprocessing therefore turned less and less on the value of plutonium as a fuel and more on the claim that reprocessing yielded environmental benefits over the alternative spent fuel management route: storage-direct disposal.

In the current period, storage-direct disposal has become the preferred spent fuel management route in most countries. Reprocessing survives primarily due to the inertia of industrial and commercial commitments made during the 1970s and 1980s. In the future, the industry is likely to be limited to a shrinking 'core' of reprocessor countries: France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, and perhaps India. Despite this clear declining trend, the economic, security and environmental rationales for reprocessing are now being recast.

The evolution of civilian reprocessing

Civilian reprocessing has remained the preserve of the few, with nuclear weapon states establishing an early commercial advantage which they have never given up. Today there are just four major commercial reprocessing facilities in the world: La Hague and Marcoule in France; Windscale/Sellafield in the United Kingdom; and Chelyabinsk-65/Ozersk in Russia. Over 95 percent of civilian reprocessing to date has been carried out at these four sites. These facilities are the nodes of a global fuel management system in which spent fuel is sent from reactors to reprocessing plants, and the separated constitutents (uranium, plutonium and waste), are typically by contract returned to the owner of the fuel. A number of smaller facilities have also operated. The map on p. 9 shows the world's major reprocessing plants. Commercial plants are marked with stars.

In order to understand the future prospects for reprocessing, it is useful to understand the development of the industry up until now.

Reprocessing technology and the assumption that irradiated (or spent) fuel should be chemically treated were an inheritance from atomic bomb programs. In the UK and France reprocessing plants at Windscale (now called Sellafield) and Marcoule originally devoted to weapons plutonium production have also been used to process fuel from civilian Magnox power reactors. Metal fuel from these early gas-cooled reactors corroded quickly when stored under water. Rapid reprocessing was therefore a safety and environmental requirement for these reactor systems in the absence of dry storage facilities. Essentially all Magnox spent fuel has been reprocessed. Reactor shutdowns in France, Spain, Japan and the UK will bring Magnox fuel reprocessing to an end in around 2010. To date about 40,000 metric tons of Magnox fuel have been reprocessed, some 80 percent of this at the B205 plant at Windscale/Sellafield.

Oxide fuel used in advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs) and light-water reactors (LWRs) can be stored safely for longer periods of time. These reactor systems are therefore more independent of reprocessing. Moreover, dedicated commercial reprocessing facilities had to be constructed to handle oxide fuel. The build-up of oxide fuel reprocessing has therefore been slower.

Oxide fuel reprocessing began at the Nuclear Fuel Services facility at West Valley (NY) and at the small Eurochemic plant in Belgium, both in 1966. A Head End Plant (HEP) which prepared oxide fuel for the separation stages at B205 began operating at Windscale in 1969. None of these facilities operated for long. The West Valley plant was shut down for commercial reasons in 1972, the Windscale plant was closed following an accident in 1973, and the Eurochemic plant was closed in 1975 following the withdrawal of German and French partners.

These early failures coincided with a renewed interest in civilian reprocessing. The energy crisis of 1973-74 meant nuclear power was given a higher priority in energy policy. It was argued that over the longer term nuclear power would be based on plutonium-fuelled fast reactors because the anticipated growth in nuclear capacity would not be met by existing uranium resources. For a brief period, reprocessing and the commercialization of fast reactors became guiding objectives of energy policy in many countries.

This window of opportunity was exploited by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) and Cogéma, the state-owned British and French reprocessing companies. They launched ambitious projects to expand reprocessing at Sellafield and La Hague. The plants at these sites would service both domestic and foreign requirements, and during 1978 and 1979 binding contracts were signed with European and Japanese utilities. Over 60 percent of the first ten years-worth of capacity at these two sites was sold to foreign utilities who funded up front the capital cost of UP3 and THORP. UP3 began operating in 1990, while UP2-800 and THORP were both commissioned in 1994.

Reprocessing programs were launched in a number of other countries, notably in Germany and Japan. Both countries began operating pilot reprocessing plants in the 1970s (WAK at Karlsruhe in Germany, and Tokai-mura in Japan), and developed plans for major commercial facilities. The German program survived until 1989 when it was canceled because of its cost and political unpopularity. Japanese reprocessing has developed more slowly than originally planned, partly due to hostile international responses to its plutonium program. Construction of a commercial facility at Rokkasho-mura began in 1992 with a design substantially based on French technology.

The 1970s also saw the creation of a separate spent fuel management regime lead by the Soviet Union. The fuel cycle for Soviet-built reactors was centrally controlled, partly as a non-proliferation measure, by the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry (MAPI). Spent fuel from the smaller 440 series LWRs in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Finland was routinely sent to Chelyabinsk-65/Ozersk for reprocessing. Under intergovernmental agreements, this 'take-back' arrangement was provided free of charge. Plutonium separated from the fuel remained the property of MAPI (later Minatom) and was stored for anticipated future use in fast reactors.

The situation today

Two civilian reprocessing regimes today exist side-by-side: the European-Japanese system; and the Russian system.

The European-Japanese system, centred on plants at La Hague and Sellafield, is nearly complete. Magnox fuel reprocessing continues steadily at Sellafield at a rate of about 1000 metric tons per year, while total oxide fuel throughput in France and Britain will reach about 2350 metric tons in 1998 when THORP reaches full capacity. The three plants handle fuel from about 150 reactors operating in nine countries (including the UK and France). Added to these principal facilities is a small Japanese plant at Tokai, with a capacity of about 100 metric tons per year.

This system is due to be supplemented by an 800 metric ton facility at Rokkasho-mura in Japan in 2003. However, Japanese plutonium policy is being reassessed following an accident at the Monju fast reactor in December 1995. The capital cost of the Rokkasho plant (1.88 trillion yen, or about $17 billion) is causing utilities to look again at fuel management strategy. There is a good chance that the plant will not be completed.

Two further elements have been added to the European-Japanese regime. The failure of fast reactors forced utilities in the early 1980s to consider alternative ways of disposing of plutonium. Although a far less efficient way of using plutonium, recycling in conventional 'thermal' reactors has been adopted by utilities in Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland and Japan as a way of avoiding the costs and difficulties of storing plutonium. To enable plutonium recycling in thermal reactors, mixed-oxide (MOX) fabrication plants have been built in Belgium (Dessel P0, operating on a significant scale since 1986), France (Melox, operating since 1995) and the United Kingdom (SMP, which will begin operation in 1997). Utilities have also needed to licence their reactors to take MOX fuel. Although technically feasible, the introduction of plutonium fuel into reactors has proven politically controversial in several countries, including Germany and Japan. The MOX fabrication and fuelling bottlenecks continue to be an obstacle to the European-Japanese reprocessing-recycle regime.

Survival of this industrial system beyond 2005 will depend on new demand for reprocessing services. Utilities have increasingly turned their backs on reprocessing in favour of the cheaper and less problematic fuel storage-direct disposal route. Sustained future demand for reprocessing is likely in the UK (Magnox fuel), France and Japan. Elsewhere extended fuel storage capacities will be made available. One open question is whether the rapidly industrialising Asian economies will come to depend more on nuclear power. This could feed through to a demand for reprocessing.

The Russian reprocessing system has been adversely affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1990 to 1994 throughput at the RT-1 plant was around 100 metric tons per year. There has been a slight upturn in 1995 and 1996 due to contracts with Finnish, Hungarian, and Ukrainian clients. However, almost all of the non-Russian clients reprocessing at Chelyabinsk are now pursuing spent fuel storage policies, while Russian reactor operators are failing to pay their bills. The future of the plant appears to depend on the faint possibility that new foreign clients can be attracted.

Summary of fuel reprocessing: 1960-1995

In 1995, 17 metric tons of plutonium were separated at civilian reprocessing plants. Of this somewhat less than 8 metric tons were fabricated into MOX fuel; the remainder was placed into storage. One of the enduring legacies of civilian reprocessing is that most of the materials (plutonium and uranium) recovered from spent fuel have remained in store. Almost three-quarters of the plutonium separated to date remains in store. The largest civilian inventories are in the UK (49 metric tons), France (55 metric tons) and Russia (about 30 metric tons). Table 2 provides a summary of world inventories of plutonium at the end of 1995, at which time total of 190 metric tons of plutonium had been separated at civilian reprocessing plants.

Table 2: World Civilian Plutonium Inventories

Inventory		Total Plutonium (metric tons)
Military plutonium		250*
Civilian plutonium		990
Spent fuel	800
Seperated plutonium in store
141
Recycled plutonium	49
Total		1240
*An older estimate of 270 metric tons (which assumed a Russian weapons inventory of 150 metric tons, rather that 130 metric tons) was published in Issue #1 of Energy&Security.

The Changing Context of Reprocessing

Although commercially the picture does not look rosy for reprocessing, a number of perverse developments have emerged over the past few years which are changing the way in which reprocessing is viewed by utilities and governments.

The first of these is the mounting problem utilities have in many countries with the extension of spent fuel storage capacity. This issue is linked to the long delays and uncertainties which surround radioactive waste repository programs. Understandably, publics living near to reactors do not like the idea of reactor sites becoming long-term spent fuel stores. In addition, environmental organisations who see spent fuel storage as the Achilles heel of the industry reason that if they can block spent fuel stores they may be able to force nuclear reactors to shut down. However, the response of the utilities in Germany and elsewhere has been to restart negotiations with reprocessors as the only way out.

The second development is the reinvention of fast reactor programmes as 'partitioning and transmutation' programs. Partitioning refers to the separation in advanced reprocessing plants of radioactive materials besides plutonium and uranium which represent a long-term hazard. These materials would then be 'transmuted' through irradiation in either reactors or in accelerator-based converters. This would break them down into shorter-lived species which could be stored and disposed of as short-lived low-level wastes. These programs are being justified as a way of resolving the problem of long-term burial, and some advocates of a plutonium economy see them as a golden opportunity.

The third development is nuclear weapons dismantlement, and the recovery of plutonium and enriched uranium from warheads. From one perspective this represents a threat to reprocessors. The availability of large new stocks of plutonium and uranium further undermines the rationale for separating more in civilian reprocessing, especially given the large civilian stocks which already exist. However, there are two potential benefits for reprocessors, who are also the major producers of MOX fuel. Recycling in commercial reactors has become the preferred option for weapons plutonium and uranium disposition in Russia, and is also being considered seriously in the US. MOX disposition programs for military uranium and plutonium will strengthen the industry by building up commercial infrastructures and subsidising commercial MOX activities. Weapons plutonium MOX programs also have the advantage of appearing to turn 'swords into ploughshares', so legitimising the activity.

Conclusions

A global civilian reprocessing industry has been built up since the mid-1960s. Today this system services the fuel management requirements of about one-third of the world's reactors. In future the importance of reprocessing as a fuel management is likely to decline. However, the resilience of an industry whose underlying rationale and economic viability have been undermined over the past twenty years should not be underestimated. This is a supply-dominated, rather than a demand-led industry. The future of reprocessing will finally be determined by whether or not political agreement can be reached on the main alternative spent fuel management route: interim storage followed by direct disposal.

1. N. B. Prasad Committee's report on Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (1982)
2. See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 180-83.
3. P. K. Iyengar in Nuclear Power: Policy and Prospects ed. P. M.
4. S Jones (John Wiley and Sons) 1987, p. 283